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JEROME K. DUNCAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
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I Case No, 950227-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 4 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT EILEEN HOWARD 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Duncan's brief demonstrates some confusion as to the timing 
and cause of Duncan's requests for custody. The brief claims, on 
pages 3 and 8, that Duncan's paternity action was filed after 
Eileen Howard refused visitation on the basis that Duncan was not 
the father of the child. Duncan gives no citation to the record 
for this claim. There is no evidence that Ms. Howard denied 
Duncan's paternity prior to the filing of the paternity action, and 
a reading of the paternity petition and accompany papers shows that 
visitation, not paternity, was the impetus for the filing. (R. 2-
9.) More importantly, the evidence shows that Duncan acknowledged 
that Ms. Howard never denied him visitation (R. 677-78) except for 
one short period when she believed the court had ordered her to 
deny visitation (R. 1070). 
Duncan's brief also claims (page 9) that his complaint seeking 
custody was filed in response to Clel staying in Pennsylvania in 
January 1993, nearly a year and a half after Duncan commenced this 
action. Duncan cites to pages 116-17 (R. 630-31) of the transcript 
to support this statement, but that portion of the transcript only 
states that Mr. Duncan sought some visitation. Duncan never filed 
any pleading which sought an award of custody. 
Of a more critical nature, Duncan's brief states: 
Although Mr. Otanez was hired to do an evalua-
tion comparing Mr. Duncan to Ms. Howard, he 
stated at trial that he did meet with Mr. and 
Mrs. Thorderson and took their position into 
account in making his determination. See id. 
at 20 [534]. Mr. Otanez went so far as to 
state that one of the reasons that he was 
recommending that custody go to Mr. Duncan as 
opposed to Ms. Howard was that placing the 
child with Ms. Howard would be the same as 
placing him with the Thordersons. See id. at 
34 [548]. 
(Duncan brief p. 10.) The record pages cited do not support the 
text. Page 20 of the transcript (R. 534) states only that Mr. 
Otanez talked to the Thordersons, not that he took their position 
into account. Page 3 4 (R. 54 8) makes comments about Thordersons, 
but does not purport to consider whether they should receive 
custody. The record, including the pages cited by Duncan, shows 
Mr. Otanez was not competent to, and did not, render any opinion 
regarding whether the best interest of Clel required placement with 
Thordersons. The trial court properly excluded any testimony from 
Otanez on the subject for lack of foundation, and Duncan has not 
challenged that ruling. (R. 548-50.) 
Duncan's statement of facts also asserts (p. 10) that Mr. 
Otanez testified that Mr. Duncan "had established a good bond with 
the child," and cites as support pages 22-24 (R. 536-38) of the 
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transcript. The citation appears to be in error; those pages do 
not even use the word "bond." Page 27 of the transcript (R. 541) 
does address the issue, but contradicts the statement in the brief. 
Mr. Otanez's testimony was that "I certainly see that there's a 
bond. I don't know if it's a strong one." The trial court noted 
this distinction, and find only that "with continued therapy 
sessions, Clel can develop a strong bond with his father," not that 
such a bond presently existed. (R. 431 f 13.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HUTCHISON PRESUMPTION DOES NOT APPLY. 
The inapplicability of the natural parent presumption, 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40-41 (Utah 1982), is most 
clearly stated in State ex rel. H.R.V. , 906 P. 2d 913 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). Duncan attempts to distinguish the case on its facts, but 
misses the primary thrust of the case. The Hutchison "presumption" 
is really an observation, "rooted in the common experience of 
mankind," concerning what is normally the relationship between a 
parent and child. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 40. The presumption is 
not a property right of a parent, but rather a judicial mechanism 
to protect the best interest of a child. Applying the presumption 
here, where Mr. Duncan never had custody and only an occasional 
visitor, "would allow the parent to rely on a nonexistent relation-
ship and to benefit from a biological designation lacking any real 
meaning." H.R.V., 906 P.2d at 917. 
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Because all prior cases applying the Hutchison presumption 
have involved situations where the parent already had custody, id. , 
the Hutchison holding is dictum as applied to the instant case 
where Mr. Duncan never had custody. This Court should hold that, 
in a custody dispute between a nonresident parent and a grandparent 
with whom a child has lived since birth and who has been the 
primary caretaker for at least most of that time, there is no 
presumption in favor of the parent. 
The trial court made no findings concerning the best interests 
of Clel, but, as shown in Howard7s initial brief, the record 
compels the conclusion that his best interests would be served by 
keeping him with the Thordersons and Ms. Howard. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
REFUSING TO CONSIDER MAINTAINING CUSTODY WITH THE MOTHER. 
Page 3 8 of Duncan's brief claims, without any supporting 
citation to the record, that Ms. Howard "has maintained since the 
beginning of this matter that she in [sic] not interested in having 
custody of her son . . . ." This statement is false, as demon-
strated by Mr. Duncan's own statements. Mr. Duncan's initial 
petition prayed that custody be awarded to Ms. Howard. (R. 2-7.) 
In an affidavit file February 2, 1993, Mr. Duncan claimed that Ms. 
Howard had enlisted his help in getting Clel back from her parents. 
Mr. Duncan further promised that he "would never interfere with 
[Ms. Howard's] right to be with" Clel. (R. 51.) The opening 
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statement of Ms. Howard's counsel at trial reaffirmed that Ms. 
Howard sought custody. (R. 525.) 
The record does not support Mr. Duncan's claim that all the 
experts agreed that Ms. Howard should not have custody. (Duncan's 
brief at 38-39.) Although no expert advocated giving Ms. Howard 
custody in preference to the Thordersons, there was expert 
testimony that custody to Ms. Howard, who was living with 
Thordersons, was preferable to custody to Mr. Duncan. (R. 809-10.) 
No expert testified to the contrary.1 
Mr. Duncan disputes Ms. Howard's claim that the trial court 
refused to consider her custody request prior to hearing any 
evidence. (Duncan brief at 40-41.) Mr. Duncan misunderstands Ms. 
Howard's position. In the opening statement for Ms. Howard, before 
any evidence was presented, counsel suggested that the best 
interests of Clel would be served by an award of joint custody to 
Ms. Howard and the Thordersons. (R. 526-27.) The trial court 
abruptly foreclosed the idea on hearing the phrase "joint custody11 
(R. 52 6), and refused to even allow argument on the subject. (R. 
527.) The trial court was similarly unwilling to listen during 
closing arguments. (R. 1092, 1101.) 
The trial court viewed this case as presenting only two 
options, custody to the father or custody to the maternal grand-
parents. Because of some preconceived prejudice against any type 
*Mr. Otanez's opinion was based on the assumption that Ms. 
Howard was not living with Thordersons. (R. 582.) The trial court 
properly did not allow Mr. Otanez to testify concerning what would 
be in Clel's best interests based on the circumstances at the time 
of trial. (R. 587.) 
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of joint custody award, the trial court refused to even consider an 
award of custody to Ms. Howard contingent on her living with her 
mother. Expert testimony supported such an award as being in 
Clel/s best interest, in preference to an award of custody to Mr. 
Duncan. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
consider that method which would clearly be in Clel's best 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Hutchison does not apply to favor a noncustodial parent over 
a primary caretaker grandparent. Mr. Duncan has never had custody 
of Clel, and the factual predicates for the Hutchison presumption 
do not exist. The trial court erred in awarding custody to Mr. 
Duncan contrary to the compelling testimony which showed his best 
interest required continued custody with his mother and grand-
parents. 
This Court should remand with instructions to award custody to 
Ms. Howard contingent on her living with Thordersons, or to award 
custody directly to Thordersons. At a minimum, the Court should 
vacate the custody award and remand for a new trial. 
DATED this C=>^ day of March, 1996. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, fat: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Eileen Howard 
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